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1 Introduction
We study an economic system consisting of experts who provide services to clients. An expert
may invest in e¤ort to nd out a clients state-contingent service costs, as well as to reduce overall
costs. We consider e¢ ciencies in a referral market and within an expert organization that can
assign cost responsibilities. For each institution, we study an experts information-acquisition and
cost-reduction incentives, and expertsincentives to refer clients to each other.
Information acquisition and task assignment are topical in policy forums. In the U.S. healthcare
reform, cost-control measures are being phased in after the A¤ordable Care Act took e¤ect in
2014. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the federal agency that administers the
insurance programs for the elderly and the indigent, has been encouraging providers (such as
general practitioners, specialists, and hospitals) to form so-called Accountable Care Organizations
(ACOs).1 Such organizations are supposed to reduce cost through better care coordination achieved
by referrals among physicians (see Song, Sequist, and Barnett (2014)). Other professionals, such as
accountants and lawyers, refer clients to each other, whether they operate in the market or within
an organization. How do expertsperformances compare in the market and within an organization?
We provide a framework for these comparisons.
In our model, each of a set of clients would like to obtain service from one of two experts. A
clients case can be easy or complicated. An easy case is always less expensive to service than a
complicated one. However, the two experts have di¤erent cost comparative advantages: Expert 1
has a lower service cost than Expert 2 if the case is easy; conversely, Expert 2 incurs a lower cost
than Expert 1 if the case is complicated. The complexity of a clients case is unknown. An expert
may exert some e¤ort to obtain information about the case. The e¤ort generates an informative
signal, and, as a convention, a higher signal indicates a higher likelihood of a complicated case, so a
higher (expected) cost. The service from an expert gives a xed benet to a client, and each client
1For a description of ACOs, see: https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-
payment/sharedsavingsprogram/downloads/aco-narrativemeasures-specs.pdf
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pays a xed tari¤ for the service.2
We rst study how experts operate in a referral market. After, say, Expert 1 has exerted an
e¤ort and observed a signal, he may make a referral o¤er to Expert 2: the client and the service
tari¤ are transferred from Expert 1 to Expert 2 if Expert 2 pays a referral price. The problems
facing these experts are: i) e¤ort is hidden action, unknown to anyone except the expert who exerts
it, and ii) the signal generated by e¤ort is hidden information, unknown to anyone except the expert
who has exerted the e¤ort.
Despite asymmetric-information problems, there is an equilibrium in which Expert 1 exerts
e¤ort, and successfully refers clients to Expert 2 if and only if their signals are above a threshold
(a higher signal indicating a higher expected cost). An experts incentive is to avoid complicated
and costly clients, so in equilibrium Expert 2 only gets lemons from Expert 1. However, Expert
2 has a cost advantage in complicated cases. Expert 1 credibly exploits this cost advantage when
setting the referral price, so the referred lemons will be accepted.
Expert 2s acceptance decision is based on comparing the referral price with the average cost
given that signals are above the threshold. For e¢ ciency, Expert 2 should have compared the referral
price with the actual expected cost, but this is Expert 1s private information. This discrepancy is
common in adverse-selection models. As a result, Expert 1s referral and information-acquisition
decisions do not internalize all cost savings due to cost comparative advantage, and are never rst
best.
Expert 2s equilibrium strategy, however, is completely di¤erent. He will neither exert e¤ort nor
make any referral. The cost comparative advantage for Expert 1 is for the client with an easy case,
but there is no equilibrium in which Expert 2 refers a client to Expert 1. A simple case is more
protable than a complicated case. If in equilibrium Expert 2 was successful at referring a client
at a signal, he would also refer the client if the signal had become higher (indicating a higher cost).
2A stylized example is this. A consumer needs to le a tax return. Simple returns are less time-consuming
than complex returns. However, a tax preparer is more cost e¤ective than an accountant for a simple return,
and vice versa.
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In other words, Expert 2 would always refer lemons, never peaches. Expert 2s referral, therefore,
would not let Expert 1 exploit his cost comparative advantage. Without any success in referral in
equilibrium, Expert 2 does not exert e¤ort.
We then study expert organizations. The referral market equilibrium is ine¢ cient because an
expert is unconcerned about the cost consequence which will be borne by the expert who accepts
the referral. Our premise is that an organization di¤ers from the market because it can make cost
information available ex post. In an organization, when an expert refers a client, the referring expert
can be held responsible for the cost incurred by the referred expert. We call this the cost-transfer
protocol. An expert now can fully internalize benets of cost comparative advantage. If Expert 1s
signal indicates that Expert 2 has a lower expected cost, he simply refers the client to Expert 2
and, under the cost-transfer protocol, reaps the cost savings. (Song, Sequist, and Barnett (2014)
identify an ACO exactly as an organization in which physicians...share the consequences of each
others referral decisions.)
We also examine a drawback of the cost-transfer protocol. We enrich our model by allowing
each expert to choose a cost-reduction e¤ort when serving a client. This adds another hidden
action. When experts operate in the market, each is responsible for his cost, so cost e¤ort must be
e¢ cient. Cost reduction is orthogonal to information acquisition and referral in the market. This
is no longer true for an organization that uses the cost-transfer protocol.
Our point is that the cost-transfer protocol introduces a new tradeo¤. When experts can reduce
their costs, the magnitude of cost saving determines whether a market performs better than an
organization. If cost saving by e¤ort is small, cost comparative advantage dominates cost e¤ort,
so an expert organization performs better than the market. If cost saving by e¤ort is large, the
opposite is true. Ours is also a theory about whether referrals should be among experts within a
rm under the cost-transfer protocol, or among independent experts in the market.
We consider various extensions of the basic model. First, we discuss constraints on experts
capacities, and variable returns. We qualify how various results should be properly interpreted.
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Second, we endogenize clients tari¤s by a Bertrand game. Finally, we let cost comparative ad-
vantage potentially be big so that a client may be a lemon to one expert, but a peach to another.
There, we show that referrals by both experts may arise in equilibrium.
Our paper is related to the literatures on credence goods, referrals, and organizations. In
contrast to models of credence goods (see the Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) survey), we simplify
expertsprice and treatment decisions. Here, an expert sets one price and may have control over cost
distributions. Furthermore, many models of credence goods are on interactions between experts and
clients. Instead, we study the interactions between experts via referral and information acquisition.
Garicano and Santos (2004) study referrals between two experts who have di¤erent produc-
tivities and costs in generating revenue from a project by exerting e¤orts. An expert can choose
between implementing a project himself, or referring it to the other expert. Referral of a project is
subject to asymmetric information because a projects potential can be either high or low, which
is privately known by an expert. Equilibrium referrals via xed price or revenue-sharing contracts
are often ine¢ cient. In our model, private information is in the form of a continuous signal, rather
than a binary signal. The kinds of ine¢ ciency in our model are also di¤erent. First, expertse¤orts
to acquire information are ine¢ cient. Second, an experts equilibrium referrals do not internalize
social cost savings. Third, when experts form an organization, we allow the transfer of costs, which
leads to shirking.
Referrals incentives have been studied in models of consumers searching for experts advice;
see Arbatskaya and Konishi (2012), Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007), Inderst and Ottaviani
(2009), and Park (2005). Experts face a tradeo¤ between honestly advising clients to build a good
reputation, and reaping a quick prot at the clients expense. We do not model search or reputation
here, but show that even without threats from consumers, referrals may occur.
Referrals are studied in the health literature. In the health sector, insurers set up incentive
mechanisms for referrals between providers, say, between general practitioners and specialists (see
Shumsky and Pinker (2003) and Mariñoso and Jelovac (2003)). We do not follow a contract-design
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approach but our result suggests that physician organizations may lead to e¢ cient referrals. Also,
market referrals with nancial transfers are uncommon in the medical sector. However, our analysis
of how an organization provides incentive to refer clients is relevant to the organizational approach
currently advocated in the health domain. We will revisit this after we have presented results.
We contribute to organizational economics. Our hypothesis that costs become transferable when
experts merge is similar to the reallocation of ownership rights within a rm. Schmidt (1996) argues
that the allocation of ownership rights has an important impact on the allocation of information
about the rm. Garicano (2000), Garicano and Santos (2004) and Fuchs and Garicano (2010)
argue that organizations can better match clients to experts, and this is supported by evidence of
obstetric practices in Epstein, Ketcham, and Nicholson (2010). We have argued that when cost
comparative advantage is internalized, matches will be e¢ cient, so we explain why better matches
happen.
However, we point out the degradation of work incentives when costs are transferred in an
organization. This possibility has also been raised by Frandsen and Rebitzer (2015), who show
that free-riding problems in ACOs may erode savings from better care coordination. Cebul et
al. (2008) and Rebitzer and Votruba (2011) provide evidence on the adverse e¤ects of coordination
failures in the health care delivery system in the U.S. The free-riding and work-incentive deciency
should be weighed against better referrals, which, according to Able (2013), is the mechanism by
which ACOs reduce aggregate medical expenditures and improve Medicare patients health.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and derive the rst best.
Section 3 studies a market in which experts can refer clients to each other at a price. In Section
4, we present organizations and compare them to the market and the rst best. We also provide
specic perspectives on the relevance of our theory to legal and medical professionals. In Section
5 we consider a number of robustness issues. Section 6 concludes. An Appendix contains proofs of
results.
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2 The model
2.1 Clients and experts
Each of a set of clients needs the service from one of two experts. These clients may be consumers
who seek services from professionals such as lawyers, doctors, or engineers. Alternatively, a company
may have projects that require inputs from outside contractors, and these projects correspond to
the clients while the contractors are the experts. We let there be a continuum of clients, with the
total mass normalized at 1. Each client is characterized by a state or a type. Each clients state or
type is independently and identically distributed on the binary support f!1; !2g with a probability
1=2 on each state. We discuss the equal prior assumption in Section 5.
There are two experts, namely Expert 1 and Expert 2. Each expert can provide a service to
any number of clients. This amounts to an assumption that experts have enough capacities. We
further assume that the cost of service (including e¤ort disutility, see below) is linear in the number
of clients served. We do not aim to construct a theory on organizations and incentives based on
returns to scale or xed costs, so nonbinding capacity and constant returns are natural assumptions.
We assume that each expert gives the same benet to a client.
Experts di¤er by their service costs that are dependent on a clients states. The following table
denes each experts cost contingent on a clients type:
state !1 state !2
Expert 1s cost cL cH
Expert 2s cost cL + cH  
where 0 < cL < cL+ < cH  < cH (so 2 < cH cL). If a clients state is !1, Expert 1s service
cost, cL, is lower than Expert 2s, cL +  , but if a clients state is !2, Expert 2s service cost is
lower. (In Section 5 we consider an alternative cost conguration: 0 < cL < cH  < cL+ < cH .)
The cost saving  is assumed to be symmetric between the experts for convenience. Ex ante
each expert has the same expected cost of providing services to clients. State !1 can be thought of
as a goodor "easy" state: the service cost is lower, either cL for Expert 1 or cL + for Expert
2. State !2 corresponds to a bador "complicated" state with service cost either cH   or cH .
6
Expert 1 has a cost advantage  in state !1, whereas Expert 2 has an advantage in state !2.
Finally, when an expert does not service a client, he has an outside option which is normalized at
0.
The setup for expertscosts will be enriched in Section 4. Each experts cost will be stochastic,
and each expert can take an e¤ort to reduce the expected value of his cost distribution (so the costs
dened above would be expected values). We will then use the more general setup to compare
markets and organizations. Until then, we use the simpler setup above. Our denition of the rst
best, and our results in Section 3 are una¤ected by the omission of cost-reduction e¤orts.
We subscribe to the credence-good framework. Clients do not get to observe their states when
they seek services from experts. Neither do clients get to observe how much cost an expert eventually
incurs to provide the service. The only contractible event for clients is that the service is provided.
To a client, for a given tari¤ for service provided, the experts are identical because each of them
provides the same benet.
2.2 Information acquisition
Experts do not observe clientscost types. Each expert can acquire information about a clients
cost type by exerting e¤ort. We assume that each expert has the same information-acquisition
technology and e¤ort disutility. The information comes in the form of a signal dened on a support,
s 2 [s; s]. Let e 2 R+ denote an experts e¤ort, and (e) denote the disutility of e¤ort. The disutility
function  is increasing and convex, and satises the usual Inada conditions.3
Let fi(sje) be the density of the signal s conditional on e¤ort e and state !i, i = 1; 2. We
assume that both f1 and f2 are always strictly positive, and continuous. By Bayes rule, conditional
on a signal s, the posterior probability of the state being !i is
Pr(!ijs; e) = fi(sje)
f1(sje) + f2(sje) ; i = 1; 2: (1)
3We rule out multiple information-acquisition e¤orts by an expert. This may be due to high xed cost
for each round of information acquisition.
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We assume that for any e¤ort, the signal satises Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP):
f2(s
0je)
f2(sje) 
f1(s
0je)
f1(sje) for s
0 > s, each e:
As a normalization, we let the signals be completely uninformative at the lowest e¤ort, e = 0,
so that f1(sj0) = f2(sj0), each s 2 [s; s], and that for e > 0, the inequality in the MLRP denition
holds as a strict inequality for each s. Under MLRP
f2(sje)
f1(sje) is increasing in s, so a higher value of
the signal indicates a higher likelihood that the state is !2:
Pr(!2js; e) = 1
1 +
f1(sje)
f2(sje)
is increasing in s.
For future use, we note that the ex ante density of signal s, given e¤ort e, is Pr(!1)f1(sje) +
Pr(!2)f2(sje) = 0:5[f1(sje) + f2(sje)].
A higher e¤ort makes signals more informative. We use the following assumption on how the
densities f1 and f2 relate to e¤orts, and call it the Informativeness Property :
For e0 > e, f2(sje0) rst-order stochastically dominates f2(sje), and f1(sje) rst-order
stochastically dominates f1(sje0).
A higher e¤ort reduces the conditional cumulative density
Z s
s
f2(xje)dx and raises the con-
ditional cumulative density
Z s
s
f1(xje)dx. First-order stochastic dominance is often used in the
literature to dene how e¤ort a¤ects information. A higher e¤ort makes a lower signal more in-
dicative of state !1, while it makes a higher signal more indicative of state !2. We further assume
that both conditional densities are di¤erentiable in e.
2.3 First best
An allocation is an e¤ort to be taken by an expert, and a decision rule that assigns a client to an
expert according to the generated signal. The rst best is an allocation that minimizes experts
expected service cost and e¤ort disutilities. In Subsection 4.1, we will extend the denition of an
allocation and the rst best to include a cost-reduction e¤ort.
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Let an expert take e¤ort e. Contingent on signal s, the expected cost of servicing this client by
Experts 1 and 2 are, respectively,
Pr(!1js; e)cL + Pr(!2js; e)cH (2)
Pr(!1js; e) (cL +) + Pr(!2js; e) (cH  ) : (3)
The conditional probabilities are given by (1), so Expert 2 has a cost lower than Expert 1 if and
only if f1(sje)  f2(sje). For each e¤ort e, dene bsfb(e) by f1(bsfbje) = f2(bsfbje). By MLRP, s  bsfb
if and only if f1(sje)  f2(sje). In this notation, the cost-minimizing allocation assigns a client to
Expert 2 if and only if the clients signal s is larger than bsfb(e).
Given the cost-minimizing allocation, the total expected service cost and e¤ort disutility per
client is
0:5
Z bsfb(e)
s
fPr(!1jx; e)cL + Pr(!2jx; e)cHg[f1(xje) + f2(xje)]dx+
0:5
Z s
bsfb(e)fPr(!1jx; e)(cL +) + Pr(!2jx; e)(cH  )g[f1(xje) + f2(xje)]dx+ (e): (4)
We assume that (4) is quasi-convex.4 The rst-best e¤ort, efb, is one that minimizes (4). The
rst-order condition is:
0:5
Z s
bsfb(efb)
(
@f2(xjefb)
@e
  @f1(xje
fb
)
@e
)
dx = 0(efb ): (5)
The rst best characterization has the following interpretations. First, the base costs, cL and
cH , set up reference points only, so their values do not appear in the rst-order condition (5).
Second, cost saving, from cH to cH    may be achieved, and cost increase from cL to cL + 
may be avoided. The assignment of a client to Expert 2 whenever s is above a threshold is for cost
4Consider  0:5
Z s
bs ff2(xje)  f1(xje)gdx + (e), which is the expected cost at threshold bs (after some
constants have been dropped). The Hessian of this expected cost is:26664
 0:5
Z s
bs
n
@2f2(xje)
@e2   @
2f1(xje)
@e2
o
dx+ 00(e) 0:5
n
@f2(bsje)
@e   @f1(bsje)@e
o
0:5
n
@f2(bsje)
@e   @f1(bsje)@e
o
0:5
n
@f2(bsje)
@s   @f1(bsje)@s
o
37775 :
Convexity requires that the Hessian is positive denite.
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e¤ectiveness. Third, a higher e¤ort yields more precise signals, but leads to more disutility. The
left-hand side of (5) reects the benet. Because both f1 and f2 are densities, the integral in (5)
would have been zero if the lower limit was set to s. Now by the Informativeness Property, this
integral, with lower limit at bsfb(efb) > s must be strictly positive, and it measures how strongly
higher values of s leads to cost-e¤ective assignments of clients. The right-hand side of (5) is the
marginal disutility of e¤ort.
We assume that clients are matched randomly to experts, and pay a xed tari¤, T , to the expert
who renders a service. Each client obtains the same benet from an expert and each experts ex
ante cost for treating a random client is equal to the average cost. The only restriction here is that
T is at least the ex ante average cost, (cL+ cH)=2. In Subsection 5.1, we endogenize the tari¤ (and
also the initial assignment of clients) by letting experts compete in a Bertrand fashion. Our results
are unchanged with endogenously chosen tari¤s.5
3 Referral market
We look for perfect-Bayesian equilibria of the following extensive form:
Stage 0: For each client, his cost type, either !1 or !2, is drawn independently with equal proba-
bilities. The draw is never observed by a client or an expert. Half of all clients are matched
with Expert 1, and the other half with Expert 2.
Stage 1: An expert decides on an e¤ort for a matched client. Then the expert observes a realization
of the signal for each exerted e¤ort. The e¤ort and signal are the experts private information.
Stage 2: For each client an expert chooses between keeping the client and referring the client to
the other expert at a price that he chooses.
Stage 3: If an expert has received a referral at some price, the expert decides whether to accept
5Any given value of the tari¤ and initial assignment dene a valid subgame of the extensive form to be
presented, so our analysis for arbitrary tari¤ and assignment is necessary even when tari¤s are determined
endogenously.
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the referral or reject it. If the expert accepts the referral, he pays the other expert the referral
price, provides service to the client, incurs the cost (as the clients state eventually realizes),
and receives the tari¤. If he rejects the referral, the referring expert will render service and
receive the tari¤.
In Stage 3, an expert may not acquire information before deciding between accepting and
rejecting a referral. This may be due to an expert having no access to the client until he has
accepted the referral. Alternatively, information acquisition may be time consuming, and delays
may be unacceptable to clients. Finally, a model with multiple rounds of information acquisition
together with o¤ers and countero¤ers, is less tractable, and outside the scope here.
An experts payo¤ comes from one of three events. First, if an expert has kept his own client, he
gets the tari¤, and incurs the service cost and e¤ort disutility. Second, if an expert has accepted a
referral, he pays the referral price, keeps the tari¤, and incurs the service cost. Third, if an experts
referral has been accepted, he gets the referral price and incurs the e¤ort disutility. Each expert
has a reservation utility that is set at 0. The referral price made by an expert can be positive or
negative.
An experts strategy is dened by i) an e¤ort in Stage 1, ii) a referral decision and price in
Stage 2 as a function of the experts own signal, and iii) a referral-acceptance decision in Stage 3 as
a function of the referral price. A perfect-Bayesian equilibrium consists of a pair of strategies that
are mutual best responses, and beliefs about (unobserved) e¤ort and signals, which are updated
according to strategies and Bayes rule whenever possible.
There are many unreached information sets. For example, in an equilibrium, Expert 1 may
take some e¤ort e1, make a referral o¤er at price p1 if and only if signal s is above a certain
threshold. What would Expert 2 believe about Expert 1s e¤ort and signal if Expert 1s referral
price were p01 6= p1? Also, in an equilibrium, an expert may not make any referral at all, so all
referral prices are o¤-equilibrium. Perfect-Bayesian equilibria do not impose belief restrictions at
out-of-equilibrium information sets. Multiple equilibria can be supported by many o¤-path beliefs
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(and will be discussed later). We will impose a natural and simple belief restriction to be dened
in Subsection 3.2.
In the following subsections, we construct an equilibrium with the following outcome: Expert
1 exerts a strictly positive e¤ort, but Expert 2 does not. Expert 1 refers at a price for all signals
above a threshold. Expert 2 does not refer. We will begin the construction by presenting necessary
conditions, then prove existence by a standard xed-point argument.
3.1 Equilibrium referral and acceptance
Consider any equilibrium in which Expert 1 has taken an e¤ort, say e1 > 0, and has observed a
signal s in Stage 1. In a continuation equilibrium in Stage 2, if Expert 1 makes a referral that will
be accepted, Expert 1 must make it at the highest possible price. Thus, Expert 2s equilibrium
strategy in Stage 3 must be to reject any referral price higher than a threshold, and accept it
otherwise.
Suppose that Expert 2 accepts a referral at the threshold price p1. How should Expert 1 choose
between keeping and referring the client? Given that Expert 1 has taken e¤ort e1 and observed
signal s, the expected payo¤ (net from e¤ort disutility) from keeping the client is
T   Pr(!1js; e1)cL   Pr(!2js; e1)cH : (6)
Because this is decreasing in s by MLRP, we conclude that Expert 1 will refer the client with signal
s whenever s > bs where
T   Pr(!1jbs; e1)cL   Pr(!2jbs; e1)cH = p1: (7)
Clearly, we can repeat the same steps for Expert 2s referral decision given that Expert 1 accepts
a referral if the price is below a threshold. We summarize the result in the following lemma, whose
proof is already in the text above.
Lemma 1 In an equilibrium, in Stage 3 an experts referral is accepted if and only if the referral
price is at or below a threshold, and in Stage 2, an expert makes a referral if and only if the signal
exceeds a threshold.
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Lemma 1 asserts that, in any equilibrium in which e¤ort is positive, referral decisions and ac-
ceptance decisions must be threshold policies. Transmission of the private signal from information-
acquisition e¤ort must be pooling. We emphasize that the incentive of referring lemons and keeping
peaching holds true for both experts although each expert has a comparative advantage in a dif-
ferent state.6 Lemma 1 does not assert uniqueness: there can be multiple equilibria with di¤erent
Expert 1 referral thresholds and Expert 2 price-acceptance thresholds.
3.2 Expert 1s equilibrium referral and e¤ort
We now focus on Expert 1s referral under the assumption that he has taken an e¤ort. First, we
introduce a belief restriction:
Denition 1 (Passive Belief) A perfect-Bayesian equilibrium is said to satisfy passive belief if
an experts belief about the hidden e¤ort and signal on any o¤-equilibrium referral price remains
the same as the belief at the equilibrium referral price.
Passive belief was rst introduced by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) in the context of multilateral
contracts.7 Here, it says that deviations are uncorrelated trembles. Suppose that, in an equilibrium,
Expert 1 takes e¤ort e1, and makes a referral o¤er at price p1 if and only if s is above a certain
threshold. If Expert 2 receives a referral price p01 6= p1, passive belief species that Expert 2
continues to believe that Expert 1 has taken e¤ort e1 and has made a referral because the signal
is above the same threshold. The restriction requires Expert 2 to believe that his expected cost
remains at the same equilibrium level even when Expert 1 o¤ers an o¤-equilibrium referral price.
6Ours is not a cheap-talk game in which di¤erent prices can convey di¤erent intervals of signals. The
referral price is binding, and has to be paid if it is accepted.
7Passive beliefis a common assumption in models of foreclosure, delegation, and integrations; see De-
quiedt and Martimort (2015), de Fontenay and Gans (2005), Hart and Tirole (1990), La¤ont and Martimort
(2000), OBrien and Sha¤er (1992), Reisinger and Tarantino (2015), and Rey and Tirole (2007). More re-
cently, it has also been used in the consumer-search literature; see Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cunat (2012),
Buehler and Schuett (2014), and Inderst and Ottaviani (2012).
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Lemma 2 Under passive belief, in an equilibrium in which Expert 1 takes e¤ort e1 and refers
whenever s > bs, Expert 1s equilibrium referral price p1 must be :
p1 = T   Pr(!1js > bs; e1)(cL +)  Pr(!2js > bs; e1)(cH  ); (8)
so Expert 2s equilibrium expected utility must equal the outside option.
The proof of Lemma 2 is this. When Expert 2 receives a referral, according to passive belief, he
must believe that Expert 1s signal is above bs. Expert 2s expected cost of providing service to the
referred client is Pr(!1js > bs; e1)(cL+)+Pr(!2js > bs; e1)(cH ). Therefore, Expert 2 accepts the
referral if and only if the price is lower than T  Pr(!1js > bs; e1)(cL+) Pr(!2js > bs; e1)(cH ).
Given this best response by Expert 2, Expert 1 optimally chooses the highest price that will be
accepted. This is the denition of p1 in (8). Clearly, Expert 2 earns a zero expected utility when
he accepts a referral. (The equilibrium referral price may be negative; Expert 1 may have to pay
Expert 2 in order to cover the expected cost because the tari¤ is low. For example, if T is just
equal to the average of cL and cH , then T cannot cover Expert 2s expected cost, but Expert 1 will
set p1 to be negative to cover that loss. Expert 1 will do this because his loss without a referral
would be even higher.)
Passive belief does rule out many other equilibria. In these equilibria, Expert 2 earns strictly
more than the outside option, but referral happens less often. To see this, choose " > 0, and for
the same e¤ort e1 and some signal threshold bs0 consider a referral price p01 satisfying
p01 + " = T   Pr(!1js > bs0; e1)(cL +)  Pr(!2js > bs0; e1)(cH  ).
Now Expert 2s strategy is to accept a referral at price p0 or lower. Expert 2 believes that the
signal is at least bs0. If Expert 1 o¤ers p1 > p01, Expert 2 would change his belief; he now believes
that the signal threshold has increased from bs0 (perhaps all the way to s). Now that the bad state
is thought to be more likely, Expert 2s expected cost has increased, so he rejects p1. Expert 1 is
then stuck with having to refer at a price that leaves some rent. Passive belief rules out such a
discontinuous change: when a referral is made at a higher price, Expert 2 must continue to believe
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that the referral threshold is bs0. (See also the discussion following Proposition 1.) From now on,
we will always use passive belief.
We continue to characterize Expert 1s referral threshold bs. Recall that Expert 1s payo¤ from
keeping a client with signal s is (6). Given that Expert 2 accepts a referral at price p1, Expert
1 refers a client with signal s > bs if and only if p1 = T   Pr(!1jbs; e1)cL   Pr(!2jbs; e1)cH . As an
intermediate step, we present a basic property about expertsexpected costs conditional on signals.
(The proof is in the Appendix.)
Lemma 3 For e1 > 0, the equation
Pr(!1jbs; e1)cL + Pr(!2jbs; e1)cH  cLf1(bsje1) + cHf2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1) (9)
=
(cL +)
Z s
bs f1(xje1)dx+ (cH  )
Z s
bs f2(xje1)dxZ s
bs f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
bs f2(xje1)dx
(10)
 Pr(!1js > bs; e1)(cL +) + Pr(!2js > bs; e1)(cH  )
has a unique solution s  bs  s.
Suppose that Expert 1 has chosen e¤ort e1. Expert 1s expected cost at signal s is (9), whereas
Expert 2s expected cost conditional on signals above s is (10). The Lemma says that there is one
and only one signal bs at which Expert 1s expected cost at bs is the same as Expert 2s expected
cost at signals above bs.
This result stems from Expert 2s comparative advantage in providing services to clients at
state !2. Figure 1 graphs three expected costs. The solid line is Expert 1s expected cost at signal
s (9). The dotted line is Expert 1s expected cost conditional on signals above s:
Pr(!1js > bs; e1)cL + Pr(!2js > bs; e1)cH  cL
Z s
bs f1(xje1)dx+ cH
Z s
bs f2(xje1)dxZ s
bs f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
bs f2(xje1)dx
. (11)
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Figure 1: Expected costs and Expert 1s referral threshold bs
By MLRP, a higher s means that state !2 is more likely, so Expert 1s cost at s is increasing in
s. It also means that Expert 1s cost conditional on signals above s is increasing and even higher.
But cost at s and cost conditional on signals above s converge at s = s.
In Figure 1, the dashed line is Expert 2s expected cost conditional on signals above s. Due to
Expert 2s comparative advantage, his cost conditional on signals above s is smaller than Expert
1s. But this comparative advantage vanishes as the conditioning threshold s drops towards s. In
other words, because conditioning on all signals above s means no information, the two experts
have the same cost (cL + cH)=2. It follows that there is a signal bs at which Expert 1s cost at bs is
equal to Expert 2s cost conditional on signals above bs. In the Appendix, we prove uniqueness of bs
by showing that the slopes of Expert 1s cost at signal s and Expert 2s cost conditional on signals
above s cannot have the same slope.
The signicance of Lemma 3 is this. Although Expert 1s referrals pool all clients with signals
higher than bs, the experts nevertheless can mutually benet from trade due to Expert 2s cost
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comparative advantage at state !2. Expert 1s referrals are all lemons, but Expert 2s has lower
expected cost servicing lemons. Given e¤ort e1, as long as the signal is above bs, the one in Lemma
3, a successful referral happens in equilibrium, as the next result shows (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium in which Expert 1 exerts strictly positive e¤ort e1, he refers a
client with a signal s  bs to Expert 2 at a price p1, and Expert 2 accepts a referral if and only if
Expert 1s price is at most p1, where
T  
(cL +)
Z s
bs f1(xje1)dx+ (cH  )
Z s
bs f2(xje1)dxZ s
bs f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
bs f2(xje1)dx
= p1 = T   cLf1(bsje1) + cHf2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1) : (12)
In (12), the rst equation says that Expert 2 is indi¤erent between accepting all referrals of
clients with signals above bs and rejecting. The second equation says that Expert 1 is indi¤erent
between keeping client with signal bs and referring. Together they determine the continuation
referral equilibrium given e¤ort e1. These are mutual best responses. Proposition 1 stems from
classical adverse selection. Expert 1s referral is based on his private information, so client bs is his
marginal client. Expert 2 faces the average client with signals above bs. Adverse selection does not
rule out trade because of cost comparative advantage.
Again, passive belief does rule out other continuation equilibria. For the same e¤ort e1, other
equilibria with referral price p01 and referral threshold bs0 are possible. Let
T  
(cL +)
Z s
bs0 f1(xje1)dx+ (cH  )
Z s
bs0 f2(xje1)dxZ s
bs0 f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
bs0 f2(xje1)dx
  " = p01 = T  
cLf1(bs0je1) + cHf2(bs0je1)
f1(bs0je1) + f2(bs0je1) :
Here, Expert 1s referral price is p01, and Expert 2s equilibrium payo¤ is at " > 0. If Expert 1
raised the price from p01 to extract more rent, Expert 2 now would believe that the client had a very
high signal, say s, and would reject the higher price. This continuation equilibrium is consistent
with Lemma 1, but violates passive belief. Under passive belief, any price between p01 and p01 + "
must be accepted by Expert 2. For e¤ort e1, the continuation equilibrium in Proposition 1 has the
most referrals.
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We next study Expert 1s e¤ort incentive. If e1 is an equilibrium e¤ort, given that Expert 2
will accept a referral at price p1, Expert 1s referral threshold is in (7). Recalling that the ex ante
density of s is 0:5[f1(sje1) + f2(sje1)], we write Expert 1s expected payo¤ per client asZ bs
s
0:5[(T   cL) Pr(!1jx; e1) + (T   cH) Pr(!2jx; e1)][f1(xje1) + f2(xje1)]dx+
p1
Z s
bs 0:5[f1(xje1) + f2(xje1)]dx  (e1):
From the denition of bs in (7), the rst integral above is Expert 1s expected utility when he keeps
the client (s below bs), while the second is the expected utility when he successfully refers (s above
bs). Using the expressions for the conditional probabilities of the states !1 and !2, we simplify the
payo¤ per client to
T   cL + cH
2

  (e1) + 0:5
Z s
bs f[p1   (T   cL)]f1(xje1) + [p1   (T   cH)]f2(xje1)]g dx: (13)
The rst term in (13) is the expected payo¤ from treating a randomly chosen client; e¤ort has a
cost, the second term, but generates an expected benet, the di¤erence between the referral price
p1 and what Expert 1 would have obtained if he had kept the client (the integral).
In an equilibrium in which Expert 1s e¤ort is positive, his equilibrium e¤ort e1 maximizes (13)
where the threshold bs is given by (7). The rst-order condition characterizes Expert 1s equilibrium
e¤ort:
0:5
Z s
bs

[p1   (T   cL)]@f1(xje1)
@e1
+ [p1   (T   cH)]@f2(xje1)
@e1

dx = 0(e1): (14)
By the Informativeness Property,
R sbs @f1(xje1)@e1 dx < 0 < R sbs @f2(xje1)@e1 dx. Also because cH > cL,
for any p1 between T   cH and T   cL, the term inside the curly brackets in (14) must be strictly
positive. Therefore, equation (14) is consistent with a strictly positive equilibrium e¤ort.
3.3 Expert 2s equilibrium e¤ort
We now turn to Expert 2s equilibrium e¤ort and referrals. Indeed, one might have thought that
some symmetrymight apply so Expert 2 could exploit cost comparative advantage. The answer
is negative, as stated in the next Proposition (proof in the Appendix).
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Proposition 2 In any equilibrium Expert 2 does not exert any e¤ort or make any referral.
Expert 1 has cost comparative advantage in the good state !1, so if there was any referral to
exploit that advantage, Expert 2 would have to refer clients with low signals. Lemma 1, however,
says that an expert would like to keep only clients with low signals; an expert will never refer
peaches, only lemons. If Expert 1 believed that Expert 2 was referring clients with low signals,
Expert 2 would cheat and refer clients with high signals. However, for clients with signals above a
threshold Expert 1s expected costs will never be lower than Expert 2s. There is no possibility of
mutually benecial trade. Given that in equilibrium Expert 2 does not refer, there is no incentive
for him to acquire information.
Because Expert 2 does not make any equilibrium referral, all referral price o¤ers to Expert 1
are o¤-equilibrium, so passive belief has no bite. For later use, we note that the highest posterior
belief on the bad state !2 can be written as Pr(!2js; e) where e= argmaxe f2(sje)=f1(sje). We say
that an expert has the most pessimistic belief if he believes that the other expert has taken e¤ort
e and has observed the signal s.
3.4 Equilibrium information acquisition and referral
Now we put together our earlier results and state the following (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 3 There is an equilibrium characterized by the triple [e1; bs; p1] such that i) (e1; bs)
maximize (13) given p1, and ii) p1 is given by (12) at bs and e1. The equilibrium strategies and
beliefs are:
1) Expert 1 chooses e¤ort e1 and refers a client with any signal s > bs at price p1 and keeps other
clients.
2) Expert 2 chooses zero e¤ort, does not refer, and accepts a referral if and only if the referral price
is at most p1.
3) If Expert 2 receives a referral at a price di¤erent from p1, he continues to believe that Expert 1
has chosen e¤ort e1 and referred a client with signal s > bs.
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4) If Expert 1 receives a referral o¤er from Expert 2 at any price, Expert 1 has the most pessimistic
belief (he believes that Expert 2s e¤ort is e and his signal is s, where e= argmaxe f2(sje)=f1(sje)).
In Proposition 3, the rst three points in the strategy and belief description follow directly
from the previous two subsections. The fourth point is about Expert 1s response against o¤-
equilibrium referral prices. We specify that Expert 1 has the most pessimistic belief. This deters
Expert 2 from deviating to a positive e¤ort, and referring a client when the signal indicates an
expected loss. If Expert 1 believes that Expert 2 has taken no e¤ort, he will accept any o¤er p
when T   (cL + cH)=2  p  0. Now if Expert 2 chooses e¤ort e2 > 0, and he observes an s where
his expected cost is higher than the ex ante cost: Pr(!1js; e2)(cL + ) + Pr(!2js; e2)(cH   ) >
(cL + cH)=2, Expert 2 will prot by successfully referring at p = T   (cL + cH)=2. Of course, this
is inconsistent with Proposition 2, so Expert 1 believing Expert 2 having taken zero e¤ort cannot
be part of o¤-equilibrium belief. To support the equilibrium, we have chosen the most pessimistic
o¤-equilibrium belief when no price is ever o¤ered in equilibrium, and show in the proof that Expert
2 has no protable deviation from zero e¤ort. The nal step in the proof is a standard, xed-point
argument for the existence of [e1; bs; p1].
Expert 2 does not exert any e¤ort, which, of course, is ine¢ cient. What about Expert 1s
equilibrium e¤ort and referrals? Using Proposition 1, and the rst-order condition for Expert 1s
equilibrium e¤ort, we write down the conditions for the referral equilibrium [e1; bs; p1]:
T  
(cL +)
Z s
bsf1(xje1)dx+ (cH  )
Z s
bsf2(xje1)dxZ s
bsf1(xje1)dx+
Z s
bsf2(xje1)dx
= p1 = T  
cLf1(bsje1) + cHf2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1) (15)
0:5
Z s
bs

[p1   (T   cL)]
@f1(xje1)
@e1
+ [p1   (T   cH)]
@f2(xje1)
@e1

dx = 0(e1): (16)
Proposition 4 In an equilibrium, Expert 1s e¤ort and referral threshold cannot be rst best.
Furthermore, given equilibrium e¤ort e1, Expert 1s referral threshold bs is too high, f2(bsje1) >
f1(bsje1), so Expert 1 sometimes keeps a client even when his expected service cost is higher than
Expert 2s.
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At the equilibrium referral threshold, Expert 1s expected cost at bs equals Expert 2s expected
cost when signals are all above bs. Given  > 0 and MLRP, equality of the Expert 1s marginal
cost and Expert 2s averagecost requires f2(bsje1) > f1(bsje1). (See also the proof of Proposition
4 in the Appendix.)
What about Expert 1s equilibrium e¤ort? Using (15), we rewrite (16) as
0:5

cH   cL
2
 Z s
bs
8>><>>:
2f1(bsje1)@f2(xje1)@e1   2f2(bsje1)@f1(xje

1)
@e1
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1)
9>>=>>; dx = 0(e1): (17)
The left-hand side of this expression is the marginal benet of e¤ort. There are two e¤ects. First,
because cH   cL > 2, so compared to the rst best, the cost di¤erential cH   cL a¤ects the
marginal benet more strongly than the cost saving . Second, we have bs strictly higher than
the value at the cost-e¤ective threshold (where f2(sje1) = f1(sje1)), so the range of the integral is
smaller. Moreover, because f2(bsje1) > f1(bsje1), the weight on the partial derivative @f2=@e1 is
smaller than 1, while the weight on @f1=@e1 is larger than 1. (By the Informativeness Property,
we have
R sbs @f1(xje1)@e1 dx < 0 while R sbs @f2(xje

1)
@e1
dx > 0.) Therefore, the overall e¤ect within the
integral reduces the marginal benet. In sum, the equilibrium e¤ort may be smaller or larger than
the rst best.8
Finally, we remark that the characterization of the referral equilibrium in (15) and (16) does not
prove uniqueness. Although examples that we have constructed so far have all produced a unique
equilibrium, we have not proven it. Formally, Lemma 3 does show that for any given e¤ort, (15)
admits a unique solution for the price and referral threshold. It remains possible, however, that
(16) admits multiple solutions in e¤ort. However, our characterization applies to every equilibrium.
4 Organizations
Equilibria in the referral market are ine¢ cient. An expert organization can perform better. As
we have hypothesized in the Introduction, the key di¤erence between an open market and an
8In fact, the proof in the Appendix shows that even if Expert 1 referred a client to Expert 2 if and only
if the signal indicated the bad state to be more likely, Expert 1s e¤ort would still be excessive.
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organization is that service costs ex post become veriable within an organization. The reassignment
of cost responsibility is possible. We present a denition:
Denition 2 (Cost-transfer Protocol) Referrals are said to follow the cost-transfer protocol
when the referring expert bears the clients cost when service is provided by the referred expert.
The cost-transfer protocol allows an organization to solve the adverse selection problem by
transferring costs between experts. When an expert within an organization refers a client to a
fellow expert, he is to be held responsible for the costs to be incurred by the referred expert. In
other words, an expert fully internalizes the cost consequence of referring the client to another
expert.
Using the cost-transfer protocol, many organizations, such as integration and partnership, can
achieve the rst best. Expert 1 buys out Expert 2, becomes the owner, performs all information
acquisition, and refers clients whose signals indicate a higher likelihood of the bad state. Expert 2
becomes an employee, and any cost incurred will be the rms responsibility. Obviously, Expert 2
buying out Expert 1 achieves the same. Alternatively, the experts can form a partnership. Here,
each expert will acquire information, and refers e¢ ciently. The partnership contract species that
an expert making a referral fully reimburses the service expense.
The (simplistic) solution relies on an expert does nothing other than providing service at a
predetermined set of costs. We now consider a richer environment in which an experts service
includes an additional input: he also supplies an e¤ort that may reduce costs. Cost responsibility
implies an incentive of cost reduction. But the cost-transfer protocol in organizations such as
integration and partnership will mute this incentive. We will demonstrate a tradeo¤ between
referral e¢ ciency and cost e¢ ciency, but rst we extend the basic model to include cost reduction.
4.1 Cost-reduction e¤ort
We enrich the model in Subsection 2.1 with general cost reduction. First, a clients service cost
is now randomly distributed on a positive support [c; c]. Next, each expert has a second hidden
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action: a cost-reduction e¤ort r  0 (besides the information-acquisition e¤ort). Then we dene
four distributions Gji on [c; c], where G
j
i is the distribution of Expert js service cost in state !i,
i; j = 1; 2. The following table denes expertsexpected costs across states and at e¤ort r:
state !1 state !2
Expert 1s expected cost
Z c
c
cdG11(cjr) = cL   r
Z c
c
cdG12(cjr) = cH   r
Expert 2s expected cost
Z c
c
cdG21(cjr) = cL +  r
Z c
c
cdG22(cjr) = cH    r
so Gji (jr) is Expert js cost distribution at e¤ort r and state i, and cL, cL + , cH  , and cH
are expected costs at zero cost e¤ort. The e¤ort r reduces each experts expected cost by r in
each state.9 An expert incurs a disutility  (r) from e¤ort r, and the function  is increasing and
convex, with lim
r!0
 0(r) = 0, and lim
r!
 0(r) = +1. The cost e¤ort and its disutility have the usual
interpretation: task management, work hours, attention, etc. The last assumptions of the Inada
sort ensure that cost comparative advantage is always valid because expected cost reduction never
exceeds . The cost e¤ort is to be taken when an expert provides service. We dene the e¢ cient
cost e¤ort by r  argmaxr[r    (r)], and the rst-best net cost reduction   r    (r).
Cost-reduction and information-acquisition e¤orts are orthogonal in the rst best and in the
market. When each expert is fully responsible for service cost, he chooses e¤ort r which results
in the cost saving . In the rst best and the market-referral model, both experts take cost e¤ort
r, so we simply redene cL, cL + , cH   , and cH by lowering each by . The rst best and
equilibria now refer to these redened values. Characterizations of equilibrium information e¤ort
and referral remain the same. More important, equilibria derived in the previous section do not
depend on cost saving, .10
9We can make the cost reductions di¤erent across states. This adds nothing conceptually, but burdens
with more notation.
10The key Lemma 3 is una¤ected because if each of cL and cH is reduced by , the solution to the equation
there remains the same. The value of the equilibrium price will also be reduced by , so the equilibrium
e¤ort remains the same.
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4.2 Cost comparative advantage versus cost e¤ort
In the enriched model, we use the full-support cost distribution assumption. An expert takes e¤ort
r if and only if he is fully responsible for costs. Contracts for the e¢ cient cost e¤ort by exploiting
shifting cost-distribution supports are infeasible.11 In principle, organizations can employ partial
cost-sharing contracts (the referring expert, for example, being responsible for 50% of cost) so that
e¤orts between 0 and r can be implemented. For brevity, we do not consider partial cost-sharing
contracts because they would not change economic principles. In other words, we continue to adopt
the cost-transfer protocol: all service costs are to be borne by the referring expert.
The cost-transfer protocol, dened above, eliminates adverse selection, but it also eliminates
the cost e¤ort. The referred expert will not take e¤ort to realize the net cost saving . This is the
main tradeo¤. Now we adopt the accounting convention that the tari¤ stays with the expert who
initiates the referral, so under cost-transfer protocol all referrals will be accepted with a zero price.
We continue with the assumption that half of all clients are matched with one expert although
the two experts operate within an organization. Consider Expert 1, and suppose that he has taken
information-acquisition e¤ort e1, and receives a signal s on a client. His own expected service cost is
Pr(!1js; e1)(cL )+Pr(!2js; e1)(cH ) because he chooses cost e¤ort r. Upon a referral, Expert
2 is not responsible for service cost, so he takes zero cost e¤ort. From Expert 1s perspective, if the
client is referred to Expert 2, Expert 1 pays a service cost Pr(!1js; e1)(cL+) Pr(!2js; e1)(cH ).
Clearly, Expert 1 refers the client if and only if doing so saves cost or if signal s is larger than es1
dened by
f1(es1je1)(cL   ) + f2(es1je1)(cH   ) = f1(es1je1)(cL +) + f2(es1je1)(cH  ): (18)
Simplifying (18), we obtain the following (proof in the Appendix):
Lemma 4 At e¤ort e1, Expert 1 refers a client to Expert 2 if and only if signal s is higher than
11Suppose the cost distribution support for e¤ort r is [c; c], but the support for another e¤ort r0 is
[c0; c0] 6= [c; c]. An expert is deterred from taking e¤ort r0 if a penalty is imposed whenever the realized cost
is not in [c1; c2] but in [c0; c0]. The full support assumption rules out [c0; c0] 6= [c; c].
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es1, where
f1(es1je1)
f2(es1je1) =   +   1: (19)
The threshold es1 is rst best at  = 0, and increases to s as  increases to .
Expert 1 will take cost e¤ort r for his clients to lower his expected cost by , but under the
cost-transfer protocol, Expert 2 will not. If a signal indicates that Expert 2s expected cost is lower,
it must be because the bad state is much more likely than 1=2. Furthermore, as the net saving from
cost e¤ort  increases, cost comparative advantage becomes less important, so referrals become less
likely.
From Lemma 4, Expert 1s total expected cost from e¤ort e1 is
0:5
8>><>>:
Z es1
s
[f1(xje1)(cL   ) + f2(xje1)(cH   )]dx+Z s
es1 [[f1(xje1)(cL +) + f2(xje1)(cH  )]dx
9>>=>>;+ (e1): (20)
Expert 1s payo¤ is not aligned with the social return to information-acquisition e¤ort. In the rst
best, Expert 2 chooses cost e¤ort r, but, in an organization, Expert 2 chooses zero cost e¤ort. We
present the following result (proof in the Appendix):
Lemma 5 Expert 1 does not choose the rst-best information-acquisition e¤ort in the cost-transfer
protocol except at  = 0. As  increases to , Expert 1s information-acquisition e¤ort decreases
to 0.
Information-acquisition e¤ort is benecial only if it leads to referrals. When cost e¤ort is
ine¤ective ( = 0), Expert 1 chooses the rst-best information e¤ort because he internalizes cost
comparative advantage. As  increases, cost reduction becomes more important, and Expert 1s ex
ante expected cost becomes lower, so he refers less often. In the limit when  = , Expert 1 does
not acquire information.
Lemmas 4 and 5 hold in a symmetric fashion for Expert 2. We now state these results (but
omit their proofs).
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Lemma 6 At e¤ort e2, Expert 2 refers a client to Expert 1 if and only if signal s is lower than es2,
where
f1(es2je2)
f2(es2je2) =  +     1: (21)
The threshold es2 is rst best at  = 0, and decreases to s as  increases to .
Analogous to (20), Expert 2s expected cost from e¤ort e2 is
0:5
8>><>>:
Z es2
s
[f1(xje2)cL + f2(xje2)cH ]dx+Z s
es2 [f1(xje2)(cL +  ) + f2(xje2)(cH    )]dx
9>>=>>;+ (e2):
Lemma 7 Expert 2 does not choose the rst-best information-acquisition e¤ort in the cost-transfer
protocol except at  = 0. As  increases to , Expert 2s information-acquisition e¤ort decreases
to 0.
4.3 Comparison between organization and market
Let e1 and e2 be Expert 1s and Expert 2s information e¤orts in the cost-transfer protocol. Expert
1 provides service to clients with signals below es1, and refers those with signals above. Expert
2 provides service to clients with signals above es2, and refers those with signals below. Referrals
are always accepted, but the expert who receives a referral will take zero cost e¤ort. The total
equilibrium expected costs per client is
0:5
8>><>>:
0:5
Z es1
s
[f1(xje1)(cL   ) + f2(xje1)(cH   )]dx+
0:5
Z s
es1 [f1(xje1)(cL +) + f2(xje1)(cH  )]dx+ (e1)
9>>=>>;
+0:5
8>><>>:
0:5
Z es2
s
[f1(xje2)cL + f2(xje2)cH ]dx+
0:5
Z s
es2 [f1(xje2)(cL +  ) + f2(xje)(cH    )]dx+ (e2)
9>>=>>; :
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These four integrals correspond to di¤erent cases of experts retaining and referring clients. We
simplify the expected cost per client in the cost-transfer protocol to
cL + cH
2

  0:5
(

Z es1
s
[f1(xje1) + f2(xje1)]dx+Z ses1 [f2(xje1)  f1(xje1)]dx
)
 0:5


Z s
es2 [f1(xje2) + f2(xje2)]dx+
Z s
es2 [f2(xje2)  f1(xje)]dx

+0:5[(e1) + (e2)]  ECt(): (22)
Next, consider a market equilibrium.12 Recall from Subsection 3.4 that the equilibrium alloca-
tion is given by Expert 1s e¤ort e1 and referral threshold bs, and Expert 2s zero e¤ort and lack of
referral. Each expert uses the rst-best cost e¤ort for a  net cost reduction. The total expected
cost per client in the equilibrium is
0:5
8>><>>:
Z bs
s
[f1(xje1)cL + f2(xje1)cH ]dx+Z s
bs [f1(xje1)(cL +) + f2(xje1)(cH  )]dx+ (e1)
9>>=>>;+ 0:5

cL + cH
2

  :
Here, each expert takes cost e¤ort, so the net cost saving  applies to each client. Expert 1 takes
equilibrium e¤ort e1, and obtains a signal. The rst integral is the expected cost of Expert 1s
clients with signals below the equilibrium threshold bs, and the second integral is the expected cost
of Expert 1s referred clients. Expert 2 neither takes e¤ort nor refers in equilibrium, so his expected
cost is one half of the sum of cL and cH . We simplify the total equilibrium expected cost in the
market equilibrium to
cL + cH
2

  0:5


Z s
bs [f2(xje1)  f1(xje1)]dx  (e1)

    ECm(): (23)
Finally, from Subsection 2.3, we subtract  from (4) evaluated at the rst-best e¤ort to obtain the
expected cost under the rst best, and we call this ECfb(). The following presents the tradeo¤
between the market and the expert organization under cost-transfer protocol (the proof in the
Appendix).
12If there are many equilibria, pick any one for the comparison to follow.
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Figure 2: Expected cost and critical cost reduction b
Proposition 5 The expected cost per client is lower under cost-transfer protocol than in a market
equilibrium if and only if the net cost saving  is below a threshold b, 0 < b < .
When net cost saving  vanishes, the cost-transfer protocol achieves the rst best. At  = 0,
we have ECt() = ECfb(). The market equilibrium never achieves the rst best. However, the
market equilibrium always achieves  cost saving because each expert bears his own costs. As
 increases from 0, expected costs in the rst best, market, and cost-transfer protocol fall. Both
ECfb() and ECm() fall at a unit rate as  increases. What about the expected cost ECt()? As 
increases, referrals become less often under cost-transfer protocol, and information e¤ort becomes
less important (see the last four lemmas). As a result, ECt() falls at a rate less than 1 as 
increases. Beyond a critical value, expected cost of the market equilibrium becomes lower than
cost-transfer protocol. The critical value b is obtained by the solution of ECm(b) = ECt(b).
We illustrate the three expected costs ECm() and ECt() and ECfb() in Figure 2. The
rst-best cost ECfb() is a parallel downward shift of the cost in the market ECm(). The cost
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ECt() in the expert organization is at the rst-best level at  = 0, but decreases less steeply than
the other two.
The basic economics principle is this. In the market, experts work hard to reduce their own
costs, but an expert acquires private information, so referrals are subject to adverse selection.
In an organization, an expert works hard only if he is responsible for the cost, but cost-transfer
protocol avoids asymmetric information. According to Proposition 5, transfer-cost protocol in an
organization performs better than the market if and only if cost comparative advantage is more
important than cost saving by e¤ort
4.4 Perspectives on legal and medical organizations
Our theory o¤ers a new perspective tradeo¤ between adverse selection in the market and shirking
within an organization. Proposition 5 predicts that experts form professional organizations when
the cost comparative advantage from referrals is important, but that experts operate as solo-
practitioners when work e¤ort is more important. Using U.S. census data, Garicano and Hubbard
(2009) show that lawyers form multi-specialty partnerships when they consult for corporations
in markets such as banking, environment, and real estate developments. Our theory provides
the foundation for the claim in Garicano and Hubbard (2009). The complexity in commercial
dealing likely calls for disparate knowledge, so cross-eld referrals are critical. Lawyers in domestic,
insurance, and criminal litigations more likely work as independent practitioners. Noncommercial
cases are more idiosyncratic, so a lawyers own e¤ort is more critical.
Another illustration of our theory is in the malpractice liability and personal litigations. Ac-
cording to Parikh (2006/2007), top-end lawyers in medical malpractice and product liability
work in large practices, but low-end lawyers in automobile and slip-and-fall accidents work
in solo practices. Our theory provides the rationale for the di¤erence in the work organization of
these lawyers. Top-end lawyers deal with more complex cases, so coordination between experts is
important. By contrast, low-end lawyers may not have to rely on referrals that often.
Referral fees and fee-splitting are common among legal professionals, so our model applies
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straightforwardly. Nevertheless, our theory can also provide a normative view on the health care
sector. In most countries, medical doctors are prohibited from obtaining nancial benets when
they refer patients. The restriction is likely a safeguard against conict of interests.13 In our
model, referral is a nancial transaction, so it is inconsistent with the current practice. However,
the U.S. healthcare reform encourages providers to form Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs),
which group together multi-specialty providers, hospitals and ambulatory care services.
Within an ACO information about patients, procedures, costs is shared. On the one hand,
coordination of care among specialists is particularly important for e¢ cient care delivery. On
the other hand, as Frandsen and Rebitzer (2015) point out, free-riding problems in ACOs can be
severe. These two issues are illustrated by Proposition 5: cost comparative advantage must be
balanced against muted work incentives in ACOs. Early evidence about the performance of ACOs
is mixed.14 Colla et al. (2013) document reduced spending for high-risk Medicare patients such as
cancer patients. Similarly, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services nd that pioneer ACOs
benet high-risk patients, many of whom have multiple chronic conditions.15
5 Robustness
We now discuss a number of robustness issues with the basic model of market referral. First,
we assume only two states, !1 and !2. This can be regarded as a normalization given that we
consider only two experts. If there are many (even a continuum of) states, then we proceed by rst
dening the subset of states for which Expert 1 is less expensive than Expert 2, and then call that
subset !1. Second, we assume that the two states are equally likely. If they are not, the posterior
13However, Pauly (1979) argues that referral with prices can improve patient welfare when markets are
imperfectly competitive. Biglaiser and Ma (2007) show that a physicians self-referral at a price may lead to
higher quality, thus benetting some consumers.
14See Health A¤airs blog, 25 July 2013, at healtha¤airs.org/blog/2013/07/25 /taking-stock-of-initial-year-
one-results-for-pioneer-acos
15For a survey of ACOs data released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services on Pioneer ACO
Model participants, see Brooking blog, 13 October 2014, "A More Complete Picture of Pioneer ACO Results"
at http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/10/09-pioneer-aco-results-mcclellan#recent_rr/
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probabilities in (1) will be modied by prior probabilities attached to the conditional densities f1
and f2. However, MLRP is una¤ected, and it remains valid that Expert 2s cost of providing service
to a client is lower than Expert 1 if and only if the clients signal is higher than a threshold. Our
computation is made easier by states being equally likely, but this assumption does not lead to any
conceptual di¢ culties.
We have ignored capacities and variable returns. Here, there is another source of cost compar-
ative advantage. The initial matching process may favor, say, Expert 1, who now has too many
clients. Decreasing returns may lead him to refer some clients to Expert 2 even before he undertakes
any e¤ort (so has received no signal). It is a complication that may interfere with the construction
of Expert 2s equilibrium belief about the referred clientsstates. An analysis will have to start
with the initial match between clients and experts. However, we feel that this is beyond the scope
of our current research.
Capacity and variable returns may also change the comparison between market and organiza-
tion. Clearly, an organization is better able to enjoy economies of scale, manage capacities, or both.
The market is likely better modeled by a random initial match, but an organization can channel
clients to its experts e¢ ciently. The details in Proposition 5 may have to be altered but the basic
principle of tradeo¤ between adverse selection and cost-reduction incentive remains valid.
In the rest of this section, we discuss two issues in details. First, we endogenize the tari¤ T
rather than take it as given. And second, we study the equilibrium of the referral game when the
cost advantage  is larger than the average cost, relaxing our assumption  < (cL + cH)=2.
5.1 Equilibrium tari¤
We modify the referral market game in Section 3 to include a Bertrand-competition game. That is,
in Stage 0, at the time when the clientstypes are drawn, each expert announces a tari¤. Consumers
observe these tari¤s, and choose an expert for service. A consumer promises to pay the required
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tari¤ to the chosen expert or to a referred expert, if any, when service is provided.16 Because we
have assumed that each expert provides the same benet to a client, a consumers equilibrium
strategy must be to pick the expert who o¤ers the lower tari¤. If both experts announce the
same tari¤, a consumer will be indi¤erent between choosing either of them, and we specify that all
consumers choose Expert 1.
Recall that a clients ex ante expected service cost is (cL + cH)=2. We now construct an
equilibrium in which both experts set tari¤s at (cL + cH)=2. First, we specify that given any
announced pair of tari¤s and consumersequilibrium strategy, the continuation is the equilibrium
in Proposition 3 in Section 3.
Suppose that Expert 1 sets tari¤T = (cL+cH)=2. Expert 2 gets no client if he charges the same
or more. Furthermore, according to the equilibrium in Proposition 3, Expert 1s referral o¤er will
give him a zero expected payo¤. Therefore, Expert 2s payo¤ is zero if he charges T = (cL+ cH)=2
or more. Next, if Expert 2 undercuts, he gets all clients. Again, according to Proposition 3, he
takes no e¤ort and does not refer, so makes a strictly negative expected prot. We conclude that
it is a best response for Expert 2 to set T = (cL + cH)=2.
Suppose that Expert 2 sets tari¤ T = (cL + cH)=2. Expert 1 gets no client if he charges more.
Furthermore, according to Proposition 3, Expert 1 gets no referral from Expert 2, so his payo¤ is
zero. Given that all consumers choose him if he sets his tari¤ at (cL+cH)=2, Expert 1 has no reason
to undercut. We conclude that it is a best response for Expert 1 to set T = (cL+ cH)=2. Finally, it
is straightforward to show that there is no equilibrium in which experts o¤er tari¤s strictly above
(cL + cH)=2. At any such tari¤s, Expert 2 will undercut.
Our construction is similar to a standard Bertrand game with rms having di¤erent (and con-
stant) marginal production costs: in equilibrium the more e¢ cient rm sets a price equal to the
marginal cost of the less e¢ cient rm. Expert 1 is more e¢ cient because he invests in information
16An expert cannot revise the tari¤ after he has exerted e¤ort and obtained the signal. Both e¤ort and
signal are unobserved to the consumer. The issue of commitment is beyond the scope here. Furthermore,
an expert cannot dump a client after the signal has been observed.
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acquisition in the continuation equilibrium. Here, the more e¢ cientExpert 1 sets the same tari¤
as the less e¢ cient Expert 2, but takes all the surplus from trade. In equilibrium all clients
initially seek services from Expert 1, who later refers some to Expert 2.17
5.2 Large cost comparative advantage
We have assumed that the cost comparative advantage parameter  is smaller than (cH   cL)=2,
so for both experts, the service cost in state !1 is lower than in state !2. This is our interpretation
for the state !1 being good and state !2 being bad. However, the value of  can be larger than
(cH   cL)=2. In this case, we have cH   < cL +. For Expert 2, if the clients state is !1, the
service cost becomes higher than if the state is !2. Now, to Expert 2 !1 looks like a bad state,
while !2 looks like a good state (but the opposite is true for Expert 1). This cost specication
actually allows equilibrium referrals from each expert to the other.
The derivation of Expert 1s equilibrium strategy, and Expert 2s beliefs remain unchanged, and
Proposition 4 in Subsection 3.4 continues to hold. We only wish to note that Expert 2s expected
cost of providing service is decreasing in Expert 1s referral threshold, so the expression in (10) is
decreasing in bs; in Figure 1, the dashed line is downward sloping.
For Expert 2, suppose now that he has taken e¤ort e2. We construct an equilibrium strategy
for Expert 2s referral and e¤ort. Again, in an equilibrium, Expert 1 accepts a referral if the price
is below a threshold, say p2. Given the tari¤, if Expert 2 uses e¤ort e2 and receives signal s, he
refers if and only if
p2  T   (cL +) f1(sje2)
f1(sje2) + f2(sje2)  
(cH  ) f2(sje2)
f1(sje2) + f2(sje2) : (24)
By MLRP, and cL +  > cH  , the expected cost in (24) is decreasing in s, so the right-hand
side of (24) is increasing in s. By passive belief, in equilibrium, the signal threshold for Expert 2s
17Clients do know about expertscost comparative advantage. (In equilibrium, they pick Expert 1 even
when both o¤er the same tari¤.) If they do not, their strategies must not depend on expertsidentities, so
clients pick experts randomly when tari¤s are identical. An equilibrium may then fail to exist when tari¤s
can be chosen from a continuous set. The more e¢ cient Expert 1 always undercuts slightly. The usual way
to restore existence is to discretize possible tari¤ o¤ers. If the di¤erence between possible tari¤s is su¢ ciently
small (like one cent), Expert 1 will just undercut to capture all clients when Expert 2 o¤ers T = (cL+cH)=2.
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referral at p2 is bs2 such that (24) holds as an equality at s = bs2. In equilibrium, Expert 2 refers a
client to Expert 1 if and only if s < bs2. This is the key di¤erence. A higher value of the signal s
indicates a higher likelihood of state !2. Expert 2s expected cost is decreasing in the signal, so he
refers a client if and only if the signal is lower than a threshold. This is favorable news to Expert 1.
Expert 1 receives all those clients with signals below bs2, so he accepts Expert 2s referral if and
only if
T  
cL
Z bs2
s
f1(xje2)dx+ cH
Z bs2
s
f2(xje2)dxZ bs2
s
f1(xje2)dx+
Z bs2
s
f2(xje2)dx
 p2;
where the various integrals average out those signals below bs2 across the two states. Given e¤ort
e2, an equilibrium in referrals exists if there are price p2 and threshold bs2 such that
T   (cL +) f1(bs2je2) + (cH  ) f2(bs2je2)
f1(bs2je2) + f2(bs2je2) = p2 = T  
cL
Z bs2
s
f1(xje2)dx+ cH
Z bs2
s
f2(xje2)dxZ bs2
s
f1(xje2)dx+
Z bs2
s
f2(xje2)dx
:
(25)
This is the characterization of the referral equilibrium for Expert 2, as Proposition 1 is for Expert
1. Such price p2 and threshold bs2 satisfying (25) must exist. Indeed, by MLRP, cL < cH , and
cL + > cH  , the ratio in the left-hand side of (25) is decreasing in bs2, while the ratio in the
right-hand side is increasing.18
For the continuation equilibrium with price p2 and threshold bs2, Expert 2s per-client expected
payo¤ from e¤ort e2 can be simplied to
T   cL + cH
2

+ 0:5
Z bs2
s
f[p2   (T   cL  )]f1(xje2) + [p2   (T   cH +)]f2(xje1)]g dx  (e2):
(26)
This has the same interpretation of Expert 1s expected payo¤ in (13). Expert 2s optimal e¤ort is
one that maximizes (26), and its rst-order condition is
0:5
Z bs2
s

[p2   (T   cL  )]@f1(xje2)
@e2
+ [p2   (T   cH +)]@f2(xje2)
@e2

dx = 0(e2): (27)
18MLRP implies that the distribution f1 is rst-order stochastically dominated by f2.
34
Expert 2s equilibrium strategy is therefore characterized by price p2, threshold bs2, and e¤ort e2
satisfying (25) and (27).
Using the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 4, we can show that Expert 2s equilibrium
e¤ort is never rst best, and may be higher or lower. Furthermore, given the equilibrium e¤ort e2,
Expert 2s equilibrium referral threshold bs2 satises f2(bs2je2) < f1(bs2je2), so Expert 2 sometimes
retains a client even when his expected service cost is higher than Expert 1s.
6 Conclusion
We posit a theory about how an organization can overcome market frictions due to hidden action
and hidden information. This is a novel approach in the study of credence goods. The extant
literature has looked at individual experts operating in a market to serve clients. There has been a
lack of focus on how organizations may change expertsincentives. Although an organization can
overcome adverse selection by the cost-transfer protocol, this leads to reduced work incentives. We
derive a theory of the rm based on cost of adverse selection in the market compared to cost of
reduced work incentive within an organization.
We have maintained some simplications in our model. It may be interesting to study the
referral game when clientsbenets, not just their costs, are uncertain. Can referral convey infor-
mation about benets? Can a client rely on an expert to tell him that a service is not worthwhile?
Our experts are prot maximizers. If one considers the health market as a specic application,
physicians are known to be altruistic, so the pure prot-maximization assumption is invalid. It
will be interesting to study how altruistic experts will play the referral game. However, in other
organizations, collusion among experts may be expected. In the spirit of Gromb and Martimort
(2007) who model how a principal may prevent or allow collusion, we can study tradeo¤ between
experts using information for e¢ ciency and experts exploiting information for collusion.
In the details of our model, we have also made a number of assumptions. Multiple rounds of
information e¤orts are assumed away. Nor are multiple rounds of referral price o¤ers allowed. We
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have also made use of the constant returns to scale in services. Any of these issues may be relaxed
for a more general model.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3: By MLRP,
f2(xje1)
f1(xje1) is increasing in x, so for any s we haveZ s
s
f2(xje1)dxZ s
s
f1(xje1)dx

Z s
s
f2(xje1)
f1(xje1)  f1(xje1)dxZ s
s
f1(xje1)dx
>
Z s
s
f2(sje1)
f1(sje1)f1(xje1)dxZ s
s
f1(xje1)dx
=
f2(sje1)
f1(sje1) : (28)
It follows that Z s
s
f1(xje1)dxZ s
s
f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dx
<
f1(sje1)
f1(sje1) + f2(sje1)
and Z s
s
f2(xje1)dxZ s
s
f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dx
>
f2(sje1)
f1(sje1) + f2(sje1) :
Therefore, at any s < s,
cL
Z s
s
f1(xje1)dx+ cH
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dxZ s
s
f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dx
>
cLf1(sje1) + cHf2(sje1)
f1(sje1) + f2(sje1) : (29)
Applying LHospitals rule, we have
lim
s!s
(cL +)
Z s
s
f1(xje1)dx+ (cH  )
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dxZ s
s
f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dx
=
(cL +)f1(sje1) + (cH  )f2(sje1)
f1(sje1) + f2(sje1)
=
cLf1(sje1) + cHf2(sje1) [f2(sje1)  f1(sje1)]
f1(sje1) + f2(sje1) <
cLf1(sje1) + cHf2(sje1)
f1(sje1) + f2(sje1) :
We have shown that at s su¢ ciently near s (10) is smaller than (9).
Now at s, we have
(cL +)
Z s
s
f1(xje1)dx+ (cH  )
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dxZ s
s
f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dx
=
cL
Z s
s
f1(xje1)dx+ cH
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dxZ s
s
f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dx
>
cLf1(sje1) + cHf2(sje1)
f1(sje1) + f2(sje1) :
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We have shown that at s su¢ ciently near s, (10) is larger than (9). Therefore, the equation in the
lemma must have a solution bs.
Finally, for uniqueness, rewrite the equation in the lemma as
(cL +) + (cH  )
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dx

=f2(sje1)Z s
s
f1(xje1)dx

=f1sje1)
 f2(sje1)
f1(sje1)
1 +
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dx

=f2(sje1)Z s
s
f1(xje1)dx

=f1sje1)
 f2(sje1)
f1(sje1)
=
cL + cH
f2(sje1)
f1(sje1)
1 +
f2(sje1)
f1(sje1)
: (30)
By MLRP, the inverse hazard rates satisfy
Z s
s
f2(xje1)dx

=f2(sje1) >
Z s
s
f1(xje1)dx

=f1(sje1);
see also (28) above. As s changes, the rates of change of the left-hand and right-hand sides of (30)
will never be identical. As separate functions, the graphs of (9) and (10) can only cross each other
once. In other words, there can only be one solution.
Proof of Proposition 1: The two equations in (12) include the equation in Lemma 3, which
already establishes a solution for bs. We then set the value of p1 according to (12). From Lemma 1,
equilibrium referrals are those with signals above a threshold, so we simply set Expert 1s referral
threshold at bs. From Lemma 1, Expert 2 accepts a referral if and only if the price is below a
threshold, so we set Expert 2s acceptance threshold at p1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume, to the contrary, that Expert 2 exerts a strictly positive
e¤ort e2 in an equilibrium. By Lemma 1, Expert 2 refers a client if and only if the clients signal is
above a threshold, say es. Let this referral be made at a price p2 which will be accepted by Expert 1
in equilibrium.
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At signal es, Expert 2s expected cost is (cL +)Pr(!1jes; e2) + (cH  )Pr(!2jes; e2)
=
(cL +)f1(esje2) + (cH  )f2(esje2)
f1(esje2) + f2(esje2)
<
(cL +)
Z s
es f1(xje2)dx+ (cH  )
Z s
es f2(xje2)dxZ s
es f1(xje2)dx+
Z s
es f2(xje2)dx
(31)
<
cL
Z s
es f1(xje2)dx+ cH
Z s
es f2(xje2)dxZ s
es f1(xje2)dx+
Z s
es f2(xje2)dx
(32)
where the inequality in (31) follows from MLRP (see also (29) in the proof of Lemma 3). Now the
derivative of (31) with respect to  isZ s
es f1(xje2)dx 
Z s
es f2(xje2)dxZ s
es f1(xje2)dx+
Z s
es f2(xje2)dx
< 0;
where the inequality is due to f2(je2) rst-order stochastically dominating f1(je2), an implication
of MLRP. Hence, (31) is decreasing in . By reducing the value of  to zero, we obtain (32),
Expert 1s expected cost of providing service to a client conditional on Expert 2s signal being at
least es.
In sum, because
(cL +)f1(esje2) + (cH  )f2(esje2)
f1(esje2) + f2(esje2) <
cL
Z s
es f1(xje2)dx+ cH
Z s
es f2(xje2)dxZ s
es f1(xje2)dx+
Z s
es f2(xje2)dx
it is impossible to nd p2 to satisfy
T   (cL +)f1(esje2) + (cH  )f2(esje2)
f1(esje2) + f2(esje2)  p2  T  
cL
Z s
es f1(xje2)dx+ cH
Z s
es f2(xje2)dxZ s
es f1(xje2)dx+
Z s
es f2(xje2)dx
(33)
a condition for an equilibrium. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3: First, (e1; bs) maximize Expert 1s expected utility (13) given Expert
2s acceptance threshold p1 so this is a best response. Second, p1 is given by (12) at bs and e1, so
acceptance threshold p1 is a best response. Expert 2s belief clearly satises passive belief.
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We now show that Expert 2s best response is to choose no e¤ort. Given the most pessimistic
belief, Expert 1 will reject any referral price p where T   Pr(!1js; e)cL   Pr(!2js; e)cH < p, so the
minimum price for Expert 1 to accept a referral is p = T   Pr(!1js; e)cL   Pr(!2js; e)cH .
Suppose that Expert 2 takes some e¤ort, say e2 > 0. Expert 2s expected utility from keeping
the client at signal s is T Pr(!1js; e2)(cL+) Pr(!2js; e2)(cH+). By denition, Pr(!2js; e2) 
Pr(!2js; e), so we have
Pr(!1js; e2)(cL +) + Pr(!2js; e2)(cH  )  Pr(!1js; e)(cL +) + Pr(!2js; e)(cH  )
< Pr(!1js; e)cL + Pr(!2js; e)cH :
Therefore,
T   Pr(!1js; e2)(cL +)  Pr(!2js; e2)(cH  ) > T   Pr(!1js; e)cL   Pr(!2js; e)cH = p:
Expert 2 cannot prot from deviating to an e¤ort and referring some clients to Expert 1.
It remains to show that the triple [e1; bs; p1] exists. We use a standard xed-point argument.
Bound Expert 1s feasible e¤orts by a compact convex set, say a closed interval of the real numbers.
Clearly we can let the referral threshold reside in the signal support, which is convex and compact.
Finally, we can also let the referral price be an element of a compact convex set of real numbers.
Dene a map 	 that takes an e¤ort, a referral threshold, and a price onto themselves: 	(e1; bs; p1) =
(e01; bs0; p01), where we dene 	 by
(e01; bs0) = argmax
e1;bs 0:5
Z s
bs f[p1   (T   cL)]f1(xje1) + [p1   (T   cH)]f2(xje1)]g dx  (e1)(34)
p01 = T  
(cL +)
Z s
bs f1(xje1)dx+ (cH  )
Z s
bs f2(xje1)dxZ s
bs f1(xje1)dx+
Z s
bs f2(xje1)dx
: (35)
Here, (34) is Expert 1s best response against Expert 2s referral-acceptance price p1 (the same
as the maximization of (13) with respect to e¤ort and referral threshold), while (35) is Expert 2s
referral-acceptance best response against Expert 1s e¤ort e1 and referral threshold bs (see also (12)
in Proposition 1).
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Clearly, the Maximum Theorem applies to (34), and there is a selection of the solution (e01; bs0)
which is continuous in p1. Furthermore, p01 in (35) is obviously continuous in e1 and bs. By Brouwers
Fixed Point Theorem, 	 has a xed point (e1; bs; p1).
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose not, i.e., suppose that in an equilibrium Expert 1s e¤ort
and referral threshold are rst best. Then f2(bsje1) = f1(bsje1); see Subsection 2.3. From the
second equation in (15) we obtain
p1   (T   cL) =  
(cH   cL)f2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1) =  cH   cL2
p1   (T   cH) =
(cH   cL)f1(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1) = cH   cL2 :
We then write (16) as
0:5

cH   cL
2
 Z s
bs

@f2(xje1)
@e1
  @f1(xje

1)
@e1

dx = 0(e1):
However, by assumption cH   cL > 2. Comparing this simplied (16) with (5), we conclude that
e1 > efb., so Expert 1s e¤ort is not rst best.
Next, suppose, to the contrary, that f2(bsje1)  f1(bsje1). First, we note that
(cL +)f1(bsje1) + (cH  )f2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1)  cLf1(bs
je1) + cHf2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1) + [f1(bs
je1)  f2(bsje1)]
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1) :
Therefore, by f2(bsje1)  f1(bsje1), we have
cLf1(bsje1) + cHf2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1)  (cL +)f1(bs
je1) + (cH  )f2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1) :
Now by MLRP, we have (28): Z s
bsf2(xje1)dxZ s
bsf1(xje1)dx
>
f2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) :
It follows that
(cL +)
Z s
bsf1(xje1)dx+ (cH  )
Z s
bsf2(xje1)dxZ s
bsf1(xje1)dx+
Z s
bsf2(xje1)dx
>
(cL +)f1(bsje1) + (cH  )f2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1)
 cLf1(bsje1) + cHf2(bsje1)
f1(bsje1) + f2(bsje1) ;
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which contradicts (15). We conclude that f2(bsje1) > f1(bsje1).
Proof of Lemma 4: The expression in the lemma is obtained from solving for the f1=f2 ratio
in (18). Clearly, at  = 0, we have f1(es1je1) = f2(es1je1), so es1 is the rst-best referral threshold
at e¤ort e1: see f1(bsfbje) = f2(bsfbje) in Subsection 2.3. The right-hand side of (19) is strictly
decreasing in , and goes to 0 as  increases to . By MLRP, we conclude that es1 must increase
to s.
Proof of Lemma 5: We drop all constants (those that involve only cL and cH) in (20) and
then simplify it to obtain
 
Z es1
s
0:5[f1(xje1) + f2(xje1)]dx 
Z s
es1 0:5[f2(xje1)  f1(xje1)]dx+ (e1):
Di¤erentiating this with respect to e1 and setting it to zero, we get the rst-order condition:
0:5
(Z es1
s


@f1(xje1)
@e1
+
@f2(xje1)
@e1

dx+
Z s
es1

@f2(xje1)
@e1
  @f1(xje1)
@e1

dx
)
= 0(e1): (36)
Now the rst-best information e¤ort is given by (5), and we conclude that e1 is never rst best
except at  = 0.
By Lemma 4, es1 tends to s as  tends to . The rst integral in (36) becomes arbitrarily small
because the integrands are derivatives of densities, which sum to 0 over the support. Obviously,
the second integral tends to 0. Hence, any e1 satisfying (36) must tend to 0.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, at  = 0, ECt() in (22) is the expected cost at the rst best
(5). Also, at  = , es1 = s, es2 = s, so ECt() in (22) equals cL + cH
2

  . Because ECm() is
the market equilibrium expected cost, it is higher than the rst best. Hence, ECm(0) > ECt(0).
By inspection, we have ECm() < ECt().
Next, because the market equilibrium is independent of , ECm() has a derivative of  1. The
expected cost in ECt() is the result of optimal choices of information e¤ort and referral threshold,
so the envelope theorem applies. The derivative of ECt() is the partial derivative of (22) with
respect to :
dECt()
d
=  0:5
(Z es1
s
[f1(xje1) + f2(xje1)]dx+ Z ses2 [f1(xje2) + f2(xje2)]dx
)
>  1
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where the inequality follows from es1 < s and es2 > s. Hence, as  varies between 0 and , there is
only point b such that ECm(b) = ECt(b). The proposition follows.
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